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11 Introduction
On many mineral or non-mineral commodity markets producers are in imperfect
competition. The highly standardized nature of those products regularly triggers ag-
gressive commercial behaviour. Moreover those markets are often cyclical: upturns
alternate to downturns, inducing modications in rms strategies. One frequently
reported behaviour is the search for a large "customer base": rms price aggressively
in downturns to maintain or enlarge their presence on the market, with the obvious
goal to reach new customers. For example the U.S. uranium spot market has faced
an important downturn at the beginning of the 1990's1: during that period Kazakh
producers have been the object of an anti-dumping duty conducted by the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce2. A similar inquiry has been conducted on the market for
PC memories (DRAMs). On this market, South-Korean producers have been sus-
pected to sell the good at less-than-fair value when the market was in downturn, in
order to enlarge their market share relatively to their American competitors3. The
business cycle eect on rms strategies on the DRAM market is quoted explicitly in
the report of the U.S. department of Commerce4,
The DRAM industry is highly cyclical in nature [...]. In the past, the
DRAM industry has been characterized by dumping during periods of
signicant downturn. [...] Because DRAMs are a commodity product,
DRAM producers/resellers must price aggressively during a downturn
period in order to [...] maintain their customer base. This is especially
true during the lowest point in the downturn.
On most if not all of these markets, storage behaviour of producers or consumers
are playing a crucial role in the price formation process. On the uranium market
for example, "on ground" storage (extracted from the mine but kept out of the
market) has presumably contributed to the decrease of spot prices in the 1990's.
1The re-estimation of the growth rate of the number of nuclear powerplants and the decrease of
the large strategic inventories (constituted by western buyers in the 1980's to face the prophesied
scarcity of this natural resource) seemed to be the main drivers of this downturn.
2see U.S. department of Commerce (1999) for the summary of the investigations started in 1991.
3The inquiry started with a denunciation by American producers. See the panel report of the
World Trade Organization, WT/DS99/R 29 January 1999.
4US/DOC Preliminary Results Third Review, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12796 (Ex. USA-20), par. 16.
2The impact of storage strategies on the DRAMs market price has also been pointed
out, in particular when demand started to decrease. Market analysts emphasized
the strategy of South-Korean producers, consisting in stockpiling the product as the
demand decreases to sell those quantities later on, inducing an even worse reduction
of the market price. The goal of this paper is to provide a theoretical justication of
this strategy, which goes against the standard economic view that rms are storing
when expecting either a shortage of their own future supply, or a sudden increase
of their future demand. I show that rms in Cournot competition nd protable
to build up inventories to enlarge their market shares only when the market en-
ters in a downturn, in particular when it reaches its lowest, for two main reasons.
First, when demand at the target period where inventories are released is low, a
rm owning large inventories is committed to sell those quantities on the market.
Consequently to a low expected average revenue, its rival does not nd protable to
produce any other quantity than a follower's one. If demand is low, the marginal
cost of storage incurred to conduct this strategy is limited. Second if the market
demand at the initiating period where inventories are constituted is low, and if the
storage strategy cannot be separated from the rst period strategy, the increase in
the marginal cost of production resulting from storage is also limited. When demand
decreases from period to period, and if it is low enough, rms are not deterred from
using inventories to exert some leadership.
The present paper falls into the literature in which the Stackelberg leadership is
endogenous. It contributes to the other studies of storage in Cournot competition
(Arvan [1985], Ware [1985], Allaz [1991], Moellgaard [1994], Moellgaard, Poddar,
and Sasaki [2000], Thille [2003]) by disentangling the "smoothing eect" from the
"commitment eect" of inventories, and relating their use to the Business Cycle
that aects the market demand. Moreover it evaluates their consequences on the
existence of pure strategies Nash equilibria. The smoothing eect of inventories
results from the convexity of the cost function: storing allows a rm to replicate
its technology of production across time, and therefore enables one to work on the
lowest part of its marginal cost of production. Integrating this reduction in its
optimization, a rm is more aggressive than its opponent on subsequent markets:
storage has the desirable equilibrium property to reduce the sales of any opponent
3by making a rm more ecient on the production side. The total smoothing eect
of inventories includes this second marginal eect, together with the direct reduction
of the marginal cost of production.
The commitment eect of inventories results from the fact that a rm is able
to force its opponent to react as a follower to the quantity it has stockpiled, when
its inventories are large and the follower's one are low. This eect is obviously
connected to Dixit (1980), but is limited by the size of the market rms are sharing.
Indeed building up inventories consists in sinking costs in the rst period to enlarge
one's future capacity to market the good, by a quantity -the inventories- from which
a rm can sell at a zero marginal cost: the rm has the possibility to ood the
market. However this threat is credible and protable for the leader only when
the market demand in target period is low enough. As said before, building up
inventories and keeping them for later sale is not too costly both in terms of cost of
production and of cost of storage. More strikingly, the follower does not deter the
leader to stockpile, neither by increasing its sales in the period subsequent to the
constitution of inventories, nor by increasing its inventories in the initiating period.
The former is due to the fact that ooding the market when the market price is
already low enough leaves any competitor who has to produce with an even lower
expected average revenue. The latter follows from the same argument sustaining the
Stackelberg result: sticking to a follower's quantity when inventories are constituted
is always a prot maximizer when one's opponent acts as a leader. The unique
dierence with a Stackelberg game is that the commitment in the Cournot game
with inventories is endogenous: rms have to pay for it, a natural limitation to the
asymmetry in market shares.
In his path-breaking paper, Arvan [1985] shows, in a model with stationary
demands, that the Cournot equilibrium of a game where rms are able to store
before selling a good on the market may be asymmetric. He argues however that
a rm may nd protable to increase its inventories to force the leader to give up
the search for a bigger market share5, leading to the non-existence of an asymmetric
equilibrium. By disentangling all the various eects interacting, I am able to reach a
more complete characterization of the Cournot game with inventories, in particular
regarding the existence and the likelihood of asymmetric outcomes. I show that
5In his terminology "rms may be put with redundant inventories".
4the equilibrium of the game is symmetric only when demand is high. When it is
low, rms build up inventories to enlarge their market share. A rst period demand
reduces the incentives to conduct this strategy: storing increases also the marginal
cost of production of all the units sold immediately. I nd that building inventories
is a protable strategy only in when the market reaches the neighbourhood of a
downturn. When the market is in upturn, rms do not store under linear costs of
production. Under a convex cost of production the most likely issue is that rms
start rst to build up symmetric inventories to smooth their cost of production across
time, then stop to store when the demand reaches its highest.
These ndings contrast with Rotemberg and Saloner [1989], who show that inven-
tories may be used to maintain collusion when market demand is high by enlarging
an existing capacity of production. Moreover it may be connected closely to the
qualitative evidence drawn from the DRAM market: without taking into account
the delity or goodwill implicit aspect of a "customer base", that is without any
other incentive than strategic to build up inventories, I show that rms nd strate-
gic storage protable in downturns. Adding the "customer base" incentive to the
model would simply reinforce the eect.
In a setting deeply grounded on exhaustible resource models, Ware [1985] studies
the entry deterrence strategy that a rm could conduct by stockpiling and then
releasing units on the market from this large deposit. While the dynamic of his
model is longer than mine, the incumbent rm does not renew its inventories once
sales have started. Entry is deterred until the entire inventories are suciently
low to induce an accommodating behaviour by the leader. The asymmetry of the
equilibrium he is describing comes from the timing of the game, and the importance
of the size of the market is not studied.
This paper focuses on the trade-o between the "smoothing" eect and the
"commitment" eect: it diers with previous studies by Allaz [1991], who shows
that storage and forward trading are used simultaneously to enlarge the market
share under decreasing return-to-scale, and to Moellgaard [1994], and Moellgaard,
Poddar, and Sasaki [2000], who introduce conjectural variations in Arvan's model
while keeping stationary demands and neglecting the search for a leader market
share. The model studied here is a generalization of Saloner [1987], Pal [1991] and
Pal [1996], who study two-period constant returns Cournot competition, assuming
5that all units produced in the rst period are automatically sold on the market in
second period. The trade-o between the smoothing and the commitment eect of
inventories does not appear, as well as the importance of the market demand.
Finally Thille [2003] studies a innite horizon model in which Cournot competi-
tors produce the good with a convex technology of production while suering risks
on the marginal cost and on the linear demand interecept. He characterizes the
volatility of the market price, which depends deeply on the source of the uncertainty
in imperfect competition. The result presented here is a step towards the under-
standing of the eect of non stationary demands on the constitution of strategic
inventories, eect that cannot be analyzed in a long dynamic settings since it is not
possible to dene value functions for non stationary systems.
Section 2 presents the model. Then section 3 analyzes the sales sub-game and
shows how the eect of storage depend on costs and demand in quantity competition.
In section 4, the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is discussed. Then I
look at the eect of a non-stationary demand, in the context of a linear cost and of
a convex cost of production. In section 5, I conclude.
2 The model
Let two producers i = 1;2 of an homogeneous and non-perishable good compete
during two periods. In the rst period, they choose simultaneously the quantities
they want to produce and sell. Every unit not sold is kept in inventories, and those
inventories are perfectly observed by both rms at the end of the rst period. Then
in the second period they choose simultaneously the quantities they want to sell and
the quantities they want to produce, given their inventories. Firms are therefore in
two periods Cournot competition.
Let qi
t be the production and si
t be the sales chosen by rm i in period t, for
t = 1;2. Firms cannot borrow the good in period 1: each has to produce at least
the quantity it sells in each period. Moreover they do not hold inventories at the
beginning of the game, xi





inventories hold by rm i at the end of period t. Then for t = 1;2 and i = 1;2, sales,
productions and inventories satisfy the following inequalities
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6Firms perfectly observe the rst period pair of inventories (x1
1;x2
1) before making
second period decisions. This assumption is crucial for inventories to aect future
competition. Indeed inventories commit rms second period decisions and modify
the second period Cournot equilibrium. In particular since the costs of producing
and carrying inventories are sunk when taking second period decisions, they lead a
rm to be more aggressive on the second period market than a rival who has not
stored. Several arguments support this assumption. First, from a theoretical point
of view, the non-observability of a past choice does not mean that it will have no
impact on current decisions. For example if a rm holds private information and its
opponent receives a signal on its choice, the value of a commitment can be restored
(Maggi [1999]). Moreover if agents use a "tatonnement" process to determine their
equilibrium actions, they are able to reconstruct a past commitment, and will do it,
provided that this commitment aect their payos. Second, from a practical point
of view, the main actors on many markets are collecting precise information on ex-
isting inventories either through market studies (realized by independent analysts,
brokers, regulation authorities on organized commodity markets,...), or by monitor-
ing closely their rivals. A more complex theoretical setting would allow for imperfect
observability of inventories and incomplete information on costs of production, but
it would make the eect of the Business Cycle on storage behaviour in Cournot
competition less clear and of course less tractable.
We restrict our attention to second period strategies that depend only on the pair
of inventories chosen in the rst period, and not on previous sales or poduction6:
strictly speaking we are considering Markovian strategies in inventories. For any



























Let C(q) be the cost of producing the quantity q for rm i, identical across rms
and across periods. We assume that there are neither sunk nor non-sunk xed cost
of production, i.e.
C(0) = 0 and lim
q!0+ C(q) = 0 (3)
Remark that relaxing the second assumption (i.e. allowing for non-sunk xed cost of
6Past sales could matter in an innite horizon game.
7production) would give a strong incentive to stockpile, since by producing everything
in the rst period a rm avoids to pay the xed cost again in the second period7.
However the most striking result of this paper does not rely on this eect. Therefore
I do not consider decreasing average cost of production in this analysis. To end up
the characterization of the production technology, the marginal cost of production




0(q)  0; lim
q!0+ C
0(q) = C
0(0) > 0; and
d2C
dq2  C
00(q)  0 for q  0 (4)
where C0(0) is the additional cost of producing the rst units of output.
Let H(x) be the cost of holding total inventories x from one period to the other,
paid by rm i at the end of period in which inventories are constituted. I assume that
the storage capacity exists at the time where rms decide to stockpile. Consequently
there are neither sunk nor non-sunk xed cost of storage,
H(0) = 0 and lim
x!0+ H(x) = 0 (5)




0(x)  0; and
d2H
dx2  H
00(x)  0 for x  0 (6)
In order not to create extra incentives to release inventories on the market in period
2, I assume that rms are able to destroy at no cost unsold inventories at the end of
this period. This assumption guaranties that the "commitment" eect of inventories
is not a last period eect8.
Assuming that storage and production costs are identical between rms is useful.
Indeed part of this study consists in stressing the dierences in rm inventories and
market shares in equilibrium: assuming symmetric payos allows to characterize
unambiguously asymmetric equilibria. The results established here are easily gener-
alizable to asymmetric payos. Finally the model may be interpreted as a short-run
storage game, where all the long-run investments (e.g. the production tool, the stor-
age technology...) are given.
7Arvan [1985] provides some remarks on the eect of a non-sunk xed cost on the storage
strategy.
8See Saloner [1986] for a study of the commitment eect of the cost to dispose of unsold units.
For example if the output were loosing its value at the end of the game, because of a "fashion
eect", rms would be more willing to sell it when its value is still high.
8To analyze the eect on storage behaviour of changes in demand from period
to period, the inverse demand in each period is assumed to be a function of the
aggregated quantity sold as well as of the period considered. Let P(Q;t) be the
inverse demand function, where Q denotes the aggregate quantity sold on the market,
and t = 1;2 denotes the period. Both the rst and second derivative of P(Q;t) are




0(Q) < 0 and
@2P
@Q2(Q;t)  P
00(Q)  0; for Q  0 and t = 1;2 (7)
In addition, I assume that it exists a nite maximal price consumers are ready to
pay to obtain the good. This price, denoted P t = P(0;t), is such that a monopolist
would nd protable to trade in each period,
C
0(0)  P t < +1 (8)
Qt denotes the nite maximal quantity for which consumers are satiated, i.e. such
that the price of the product is equal to 0 whenever this quantity is sold. Then
P(Qt;t) = 0 if Qt > Qt for t = 1;2 (9)
The dierence between the two periods comes therefore from parallel shifts in de-
mand from period to period, modifying solely the pair (P t;Qt).
Let  be the discount rate at which rms are working,  < 1. Firm i's total prot























The two periods Cournot storage game in which two rms (1 and 2) interact using
respectively strategies (!1;!2) and earning respectively prots (1(!1;!2);2(!1;!2))
is denoted G.
3 Storage eect on second period sales
In second period, rms maximize their current prots given rst period inventories.
Since the game ends up at this period, there is no point for them to build up
extra inventories. Therefore, for any si
2 the rm is ready to sell, the production
9qi
2 is determined in such a way that together with inventories xi
1, it matches sales
si
2 exactly. If xi
1 is lower than the planned level of sales si
2, then production is




if inventories are larger than planned sales then the production is equal to 0. It
remains to describe the eect of inventories on rms market behaviour si
2.
As already seen by Arvan and Ware, when storing before selling, a rm sinks the
cost of production of these units. Consequently it endows itself with a capacity xi
1
from which it may sell at a marginal cost equal to 0 later on. Once past inventories
have been exhausted by current sales, the rm has to produce again to be able to
sell more. First, selling in addition to its inventories obliges the rm to start its
production tool and therefore to pay a strictly positive incremental cost of produc-
tion. Second, when the marginal cost of production is strictly increasing, selling an
amount larger than its inventories is feasible at a total cost strictly lower than the
cost it would suer to produce this quantity in a single period. Under a convex cost
of production, rms have an incentive to store in order to replicate the technology
of production across time and reduce the total cost of producing a given quantity.
This cost reduction may be used strategically by Cournot competitors: therefore
the higher the inventories cumulated in previous periods are, the more aggressive
is a rm on the current period market. To x the ideas, it is helpful to stress the
dierence between the game G and the static Cournot game by introducing the cost
of production faced by a rm when selling si





















Whereas rms costs of production are identical, rms costs to sell si
2 when they
own xi
1 in inventories dier from each other when inventories dier: asymmetric
equilibria may therefore appear in this symmetric setting. Figure 1 represents this
cost function and compare it with the no inventories case. Inventories shift the
marginal cost of producing a given level of sales to the South-East of the graph: a
Cournot competitor with inventories is more aggressive than a Cournot competitor
without inventories. Moreover whenever C(q) is discontinuous or non dierentiable
at ~ q,  (si
2;xi
1) is discontinuous or non dierentiable at si
2 = ~ q + xi
1.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 FROM APPENDIX (A.) HERE]
10The best responses of rms when choosing sales are continuous but, as a conse-
quence of the strictly positive marginal cost of production, present two kinks. For
































When its opponent sells a larger quantity on the market, selling more than its inven-
tories may be too costly for rm i: it may generate a marginal revenue always lower
than the marginal cost of production, no matter the quantity produced. However
if selling exactly its inventories generates a strictly positive marginal revenue given

























Finally when its opponent sells a very large quantity on the market, the marginal
revenue of selling exactly its inventories may be strictly negative. In that case rm i
sells strictly less than its inventories to maximize its prots. This choice is a function
of the sales of its opponent only, g2(s
j
2), and is not rm specic contrary to fi
2 which


















Note that this description of a rm best choice is valid when its inventories xi
1 are
small enough9. Without loss of generality we restrict the description of the sub-game
equilibria of the game to this case, since it encompasses the two other cases.
Let us introduce some useful notations: (s1
';'0;s2
';'0) denotes the equilibrium
when it results from the intersection of functions ' for rm 1 and '0 for rm 2,










1 are larger than sM
2 solution of P 0(sM
2 ) sM
2 + P(sM
2 ;2)   C0(0) = 0, then
obviously the rst inequality in (13) is always satised for any values of rm j's sales, and rm i
will not produce again in that period: its best choice is given either by (13) or (14). If inventories
















11denotes the intersection between function ' for rm 1 and x2
1 for rm 211. Finally
(x1
1;x2
1) is the equilibrium when both rms sell exactly their inventories. As lemma 1
below establishes, the extent to which a Cournot competitor may use its inventories
to act as a leader on the target market depends on the size of the market demand.
Indeed whenever the market demand is low enough, the market price resulting from
sales by a rm beneting from a null marginal cost may be lower than the marginal
cost of production of any other rm who has to produce to serve the market. In that
case the latter will not nd protable to produce, meaning that the former owning
large inventories may ood the market and obtain a leader market share. For some




On the other hand when the market demand is high enough, the owner of inven-
tories cannot deter its opponent with no inventories to produce in second period:
its marginal revenue may be higher than its marginal cost of production for some
sales level. This rm will indeed produce and sell the good, leaving the owner of
inventories with unsold quantities. The higher is the second period demand the
larger will be the set of inventories (x1
1;x2
1) for which a rm will nd protable to
produce and sell a positive amount when its opponent owns large inventories. There-
fore the sale levels s1
g;f and s2
f;g represent the upper bounds on the leadership each
rm can exert in second period through the inventories it has constituted in rst
period. Remark that the greater is the second period demand relatively to the cost
C0(0) the smaller is the region in which rms exert a leadership or sell exactly their
inventories: the bound si
g;f tends to si
f;f for both rms. The commitment power of
inventories vanishes when the market demand increases.
Lemma 1 When the second period demand is low enough, P(g2(0);2) C0(0)  0,
a rm that builds up large inventories in the rst period to obtain the leadership
cannot be obliged to sell less than this quantity by its opponent who has not stored.
The second period sales sub-game admits 7 types of equilibria in which each rm
11For example (s1
g;x;x2
1) results from the intersection of g2(s2
2) and x2
1.





























































When the second period demand is high enough, P(g2(0);2) C0(0) > 0, a rm that
builds up large inventories to obtain the leadership in the rst period may be obliged
to sell less than its inventories by an opponent producing and selling starting from















Frontiers of regions R2, R3, R5, and R6 are obviously modied.
Proof. Available upon request (Referees may nd the proof in appendix B.)k
It may be helpful for the reader to refer to the following gures.
[INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 FROM APPENDIX (A.) HERE]
The last section is devoted to the analysis of the rst period and discuss the eect
of the business cycle on the constitution of inventories in Cournot competition.
4 Storage choice in rst period




1) be the value of rm i 's second period prot (i = 1;2) as a function


































13This prot is continuous, but even if it is concave on each of the regions dened in
lemma 1 under some standard assumptions, it is non concave on the full domain
and non dierentiable at certain pairs of inventories with respect to xi
1. As pointed
out also by Arvan, these non-concavities arise because a player may nd protable
to cease to smooth its cost of production to behave as a leader. Facing a leader the
other player prefers to reduce its sales on the second period market: payos may
have a local maximum in regions R5 and R6 as well as in R7. Firm i's total prot to































Without any inventories at the beginning of the game, a close look at this prot
shows immediately that rms trade-o is to decide how to allocate rst period
production between revenue in period 1 thanks to sales si
1, and prot in period
2 thanks to the marginal eect of inventories on prots net of the storage cost.
As discussed later, if a rm is storing and selling in period 1, the marginal revenue
coming from period 1 sales has to be equal to the marginal protability of inventories
in period 2 net of storage costs.
Some pairs of inventories lead to strictly dominated second period sub-games
for any rst period sales (s1
1;s2
1). When deciding how much to store, and since
producing is costly, a rm never chooses to carry more to period 2 than what it will
sell. Moreover, since it is costly to produce and store, both rms never choose to store
and sell exactly their inventories: whenever one rm tries to store a large amount
to act as a Stackelberg leader, the other stores a small amount. As in games with
exogenous commitment and strategic substitutes, the follower is better-o selling a
small quantity when its opponent sells a large quantity.
Proposition 1 Any pair of inventories (x1
1;x2
1) such that at least one rm sells less
than its inventories in second period, or both rms sell exactly their inventories in
second period, leads to a strictly dominated second period sub-game for any rst
period sales (s1
1;s2
1). Therefore pairs of inventories belonging to regions R1, R2, R3,
R4, R8, and R9 cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy of the game G.
Proof. See appendix C.k
14The consequence of this lemma is that rms storage choices - when they exist in
pure strategy - is either for both to sell more than their inventories, or for one to
sell exactly its inventories, the other acting as a follower in second period. To put
it dierently if there is an equilibrium candidate in which one rm stores a large
quantity and its opponent a small quantity, the latter never deviates unilaterally from
that equilibrium by storing more. Therefore if one rm nds protable to store a
large quantity, the game may end up in an asymmetric equilibrium. Moreover rms
will not use those pairs of inventories when designing mixed strategies.
The marginal protability of inventories allow us to draw another important but
intuitive feature of the Cournot game with inventories.
Lemma 2 When rms sell (s1
f;f;s2
f;f) in second period, an increase in rst period
inventories increases their second period prot. The marginal protability of inven-






























where  > 0 is dened in appendix D.
Proof. The proof is immediate (referees may look at appendix D.)k
If the marginal cost of production is constant, C00(q) = 0, inventories are not
used to smooth the cost of production. The marginal protability of an increase in
inventories in that case is equal to 0: small inventories do not modify rms future
behaviour. However large inventories can still modify rms behaviour no matter
the convexity of the cost of production, as appear in lemma 3 below. When one
rm (the leader) stores a large amount and the other (the follower) produces in
second period, the follower's marginal benet to carry inventories comes only from
the reduction of the marginal cost of production, while the leader enjoys a limited
leadership. Again if the marginal cost of production is constant the follower earns
no prot from storing.
15Lemma 3 When rm 1 produces in second period while rm 2 sells exactly its
inventories, (s1
f;x;x2


















































The eects are reversed when rms are selling (x1
1;s1
x;f) in period 2.
Proof. The proof is immediate (referees may look at appendix D.)k
In the rst period, rms simultaneously maximize their prots (16) with respect
to rst period sales si
1 and inventories xi
1. Let Ji be the Jacobian vector of the


































where the eect of inventories on second period prot depends on the regions to


























Since the rst element on the diagonal is obviously negative, we need to check
that the determinant of the Hessian matrix Hi is positive to be insured that Hi is
negative semi-denite and therefore that the objective function is concave in each





























If the second period prot is concave with respect to inventories xi
1 in every region not
excluded by proposition 1, and if moreover the cross partial derivative of this prot
with respect to xi
1 and x
j




it exists local strictly decreasing best response functions. The main diculty is
however to characterize the global properties of these best response functions, and
the consequences these properties may have on the existence of an equilibrium in
pure strategies.
16Theorem 1 below shows, under fairly general conditions on the demand func-
tion but under the assumption of a linear cost of production, that the two-periods
Cournot game with inventories G has a pure strategy Nash-Perfect equilibrium. Why
does the linearity of the cost of production matter for the existence of a pure strat-





1) are innocuous regarding the properties of the best response when xi
1 is
the unique strategy of the rm in the rst period12, they create upward jumps in
the choice of si
1 when the rms have two strategies. Indeed if the choice of si
1 cannot
be separated from the choice of xi
1, as it is the case with any cost of production
other than linear13, a downward jump in xi
1 decreases the cost of production and
allow to increase brutally sales si
1, as appear in the rst element of (17). As in
any game where actions are strategic substitutes, this type of jump jeopardizes the




1) at which the jump
happens is evolving with the parameters of the model, making impossible to insure
the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for all their possible values.
Theorem 1 If the second order derivative of the inverse demand P 00(Q) is constant,
and if the cost of production C(q) is linear, C0(q) = C0(0) q = c q, then the game G
has a pure strategy Nash-Perfect equilibrium.
Proof. See appendix E.k
The equilibrium in pure strategies exists presumably for not too convex costs of
production: the upward jumps when choosing sales are limited. Note that multiple
equilibria may arise: for some parameter values the asymmetric and symmetric issues
may coexist simultaneously. In the next section I derive two corollaries from this
theorem, then I deepen the analysis of the rst period rst order conditions to try
derive some properties of the equilibrium when it exists in pure strategy.
12Mitraille [2003] shows in a version of G without any demand in the rst period that it always
exist a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The issue of the game is either symmetric, or asymmetric,
depending on second period demand, the cost of storage and the degree of convexity of the cost
of production. In particular the two players may have a local inuence on second period payos
through their inventories.
13As appear in the expression of the Jacobian Ji, when the cost of production is linear, C0(si
1 +
xi
1) = C0(0) = c, the two rst order conditions can be treated separately since they depend only
on one endogenous variable when considering the choice of the opponent as given.
174.2 Eect of the Business Cycle
The rst corollary examines the case of a high second period demand.
Corollary 1 If the cost of production is linear, and if the second period demand is
high enough for some given discount factor and storage cost, then the game G has a
unique symmetric Nash-Perfect equilibrium, in which both rms are not storing and
selling the one-shot Cournot quantity in each period.
From theorem 1 we know that it exists an equilibrium in pure strategy. Consider
the asymmetric candidate xL











> 0 if xL
1 = s1
g;f






f;f) designates the Cournot symmetric outcome, which can be an
equilibrium of the sub-game in the absence of the cost smoothing eect. The prot
obtained by rm 1 when storing xL
1 has to be compared with the Cournot prot
in second period obtained when not storing at all. Depending on the degree of
convexity of the storage cost and on the discount factor, even if xL
1 is interior to
the asymmetric region, a too high demand makes the exercise of some leadership
too costly. On the other hand if the second period demand is low enough the cost
of exerting the leadership is low enough to make the asymmetric choice xL
1 close
to the Stackelberg quantity which maximizes the prot when the commitment is
exogenous. The comparison between the Stackelberg-like and the Cournot prots
will turn in favour of the asymmetric issue.
Corollary 2 If the cost of production is linear, and if the second period demand is
low enough, then the game G has a two asymmetric Nash-Perfect equilibria, in which
one rm stores in rst period to obtain the leadership on the second period market.
Its competitor does not store.
Together with corollaries 1 and 2, theorem 1 extends Arvan's theorem on the ex-
istence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium in this game (see Arvan (1985) theorem
1, p. 572): if, as stated in the assumptions sustaining Arvan's result, the second
period prot is globally concave in inventories, then there are no discontinuities in
18the choice of inventories and therefore no upward jumps in the sales choice in rst
period. The game has naturally an equilibrium in pure strategy which is symmetric.
However it is possible to nd symmetric equilibria in pure strategy even in the game




1). In the particular context of a lin-
ear cost the two corollaries to theorem 1 stated above illustrate that the driver of the




1), but the importance





of course sucient to have the symmetry of the equilibrium, is not necessary. This
analysis may be generalized to the case of a convex cost of production, keeping in
mind that the pure strategy equilibrium may not exist. In that case one has to look
at mixed strategy Nash equilibria14.
Consider again the system (17). In a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (if it exists),
si
1 and xi








1) = 0 if si
1 > 0













1) = 0 if xi
1 > 0
< 0 if xi
1 = 0
(22)
Some key features on the eect of dierences in demands between periods may be
established when the costs of production are convex. First, the higher second period
benet a player can hope is a prot resulting from a limited leadership. However by
storing this player increases its rst period cost of production and looses some mar-
ket shares to the benet of its opponent. Looking for exerting some second period
leadership is equivalent to accept to suer some rst period "followership". If rst
period demand is high enough compared to second period demand, the marginal
revenue from selling may be always higher than the marginal prot from storing
in rst period, and the two equations above cannot be equated. In that case no
inventories will be constituted. It is consequently unlikely to observe the constitu-
tion of strategic inventories when the market is at the peak of an upturn. If on
14It presumably exists mixed strategy equilibria in which rms put some weight on a pair (high
sales,low inventories) and some weight on a pair (low sales, high inventories). One has to check
whether a symmetric pair may be part of the equilibrium strategy, but the analysis will have to be
done in particular cases.
19the contrary rst period demand is low enough, two favourable situations for the
constitution of inventories may appear. Either the market is reaching the bottom of
a downturn, with a rst period demand higher than second period demand, and one
rm only will presumably exert some leadership (the other one does not store since
smoothing costs does not matter when demand decreases), or the market demand
start to increase from a very low rst period level, and in that case a symmetric
equilibrium may appear if the dierence between demands is high enough. In this
latter case both rms will enjoy a local inuence on second period prots through
their inventories.
5 Discussion and extensions
I have shown in a two periods model that one is more likely to observe in downturns
the use of strategic inventories to allow one rm to exert some limited leadership.
This result has been established by restricting the analysis to a separable problem
across periods in order to insure the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strate-
gies. When the two periods are not separable, the non-existence of a pure strategy
equilibrium comes from the fact that rms have to constitute their inventories in
one single period. Since only the cumulated inventories count when coming to the
period at which they are released, a way to proceed could possibly be to allow rms
to stockpile the good on several periods instead of one. This much more realistic set-
ting would allow rms to separate the two problems - determining optimal sales and
building up inventories in order to get the leadership on the market- by stockpiling
small amounts in each period. In that case the cost of production would be close
enough to the cost of sales in each period, but of course the cumulated inventories
would be big enough to allow rms to get a larger market share, provided that the
cost of storage is not too high. From the theoretical evidence drawn before, my
conjecture is however that the search for a leader market share cannot happen in
each period: under a convex cost of production rms will nd protable to stockpile
by adding little quantities to their cumulated inventories in each period, in order
not to loose too much in each period, and then release those quantities on the most
favourable target market. I have shown in a two period game that the most prof-
itable period to release inventories on a market is during a downturn in terms of the
20potential gain in market shares. In a longer dynamic, the same may be true: rms
may build up small inventories at a low cost, those inventories having the higher
marginal eect in periods of low demand. This conjecture seems consistent with the
qualitative empirical evidence presented in introduction.
The use of strategic inventories in downturns pointed out in this paper may be
connected to dumping practices: indeed storage consists in a capacity from which it
is rational for rms to sell even at a price equal to 0. There is no cost of production
suered to release these units. Moreover depending on the market demand rms
are committed to ood the market once inventories are constituted. The results
established here are a possible explanation of why in several cases, Public Authorities
involved in the control of International Trade have observed large inventories before
downturns, and received in return complaints from rms obliged to reduce their
sales in those period (see WTO (1999)). By increasing competition, storage lowers
the price in downturns. Therefore if the rm who stores is better-o, it worsens the
situation for the rm who does not store. Some producers may clearly be against
the use of inventories, while others may be in favour. In the short run, the overall
eect on the Social Welfare is positive, for the same reason that the Social Welfare in
Stackelberg competition is higher than in Cournot competition. In the long run, if
the consequence of asymmetric market shares is to provoke the exit of one producer
from the market, and if for example the "customer base" eect locks buyers to their
current suppliers, the eect on the Social Welfare may be negative, which is a strong
rationale for Public Authorities to look carefully at strategic storage behaviour.
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A. Figures




Cost to sell si
2 units without inventories, C(si
2)
Cost to sell si
2 units with inventories,  i(si
2; xi
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Increase of the set of feasible sales




























































Figure 3: Subgame equilibrium when P(g2(0);2)   C0(0) > 0.
24B. FOR REFEREES ONLY - Proofs of lemma 1
In the second period each rm chooses its sales by maximizing the second period





















1) is given by (11), for non-negative sales and non-negative inventories.
This maximization problem depend on the inventories of rm i in the following way.
First of all remark that the gross revenue of each rm admits a unique maximum



























This rst order condition depicted above is sucient to determine the maximum
g2(s
j













2) < 0 (B.3)
and as long as s
j
2  Q2, the solution is interior, g2(s
j
2) > 0. In the remaining we omit
the last part of this piece of the reaction function, namely g2(s
j
2) = 0 for s
j
2  Q2
since it deals with a strictly dominated strategy for rm j, i.e. selling more than the




2) of a rm.
The rst case for the inventories xi
1 is when they exceed the quantity that rm i





2) is obviously the best choice. Indeed the function g2(s
j
2) is strictly decreasing
with s
j


























This slope is strictly lower than one in absolute value. The higher rm j's sales are,
the lower rm i's sales will be: whenever the inventories xi
1 are higher than g2(0),




2) does not depend on xi
1, note that
the condition xi
1  g2(0) is strictly equivalent to P 0(xi
1)xi
1+P(xi
1;2)  0: as soon as
the inventories are such that the marginal revenue of exhausting xi
1 when alone on
25the market is negative, rm i will always prefer to maximize its gross revenue and















1;2)  0 (B.5)
Remark now that when producing again in the second period, rm i will sell




1), which is rm-specic since it
depends on xi





















































1) = 0 (B.7)
and is again strictly decreasing with s
j



























Note that this solution is unique when it exists, and that the slope of this function
is strictly lower than one in absolute value.
Consider now the case where P 0(xi
1)xi
1 + P(xi
1;2) > 0. Selling exactly xi
1 is
therefore a possible solution for some values of s
j




selling more than its inventories will never be a solution for rm i for any s
j
2. Note
that this condition is equivalent to P 0(xi
1)xi
1 + P(xi
1;2)   C0(0)  0: as soon as the
net marginal prot of selling one unit in addition to the inventories is positive, rm




1;2) > 0 and P 0(xi
1)xi
1+P(xi
1;2) C0(0)  0, rm i will sell according
to g2(s
j
2) as long as s
j
2 is such that g2(s
j
2) < xi


















2;2)  0, rm i would be
willing to sell more than its inventories since the marginal prot of selling exactly
xi
1 is strictly positive. However since P 0(xi
1)xi
1 + P(xi
1;2)   C0(0)  0, producing
again is not protable at the margin: therefore when s
j








2;2)  0, rm i will sell exactly xi








































26Let us now consider the last case, P 0(xi
1)xi
1+P(xi
1;2) C0(0) > 0. We have seen
that rm i could nd protable to produce again to sell more than its inventories.



















1, then rm i will sell exactly xi












1). Indeed in this last case, the prot is strictly increasing as long as
si
2  xi















































































Again this best response is decreasing but continuous.
As shown before, the slope of the reaction function Bi
2(s
j
2) is always strictly
lower than 1 under our assumptions on the cost and the inverse demand functions.
Consequently the Cournot equilibrium will be unique for every pair of inventories and
will always exist. The remaining part of this proof discuss the type of equilibrium
that arises depending on the inventories. We show that the second period sales sub-
game will have at least 7 and at most 9 intersections, depending on the parameters
of the model and in particular on the size of the market of that period.
The rst and obvious case is when both inventories are large enough to rule out


































g;g) is the intersection of g2(s1
2) and g2(s2
















Note that the quantities sold in equilibrium are not a functional form of the in-
ventories, but are only a function of the market demand. The dependance to the
27inventories comes from the region of the plan (x1
1;x2
1) in which this equilibrium is
valid.
Consider now the case P 0(x1
1)x1
1 + P(x1
1;2)  0, P 0(x2
1)x2
1 + P(x2









depending on the inventories of both rms. Indeed if x2
1 is such that the marginal
revenue of selling the entire inventories while the opponent reacts according to g2(s
j
2)






1;2)  0 the equilibrium is (s1
g;g;s2






1;2) > 0, rm 2 could still realize a positive prot by selling more than
its inventories, but since it has to produce again, it suers an extra cost. We are
considering the case where P 0(x2
1)x2
1 + P(x2
1;2)   C0(0)  0, therefore the marginal
benet of producing again is negative when rm 1 is selling g2(x2
1). Firm 2 will stick
to sell x2
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In the case P 0(x1
1)x1
1+P(x1
1;2)  0, P 0(x2
1)x2
1+P(x2
1;2) C0(0) > 0, 3 equilibria





1;2)  0, rm 2 will reduce its
sales and the equilibrium will be (s1
g;g;s2






















1;2)   C0(0) < 0
x2
1 = 0
then the expression will always be negative for any x2
1 since it is decreasing with x2
1:
















which is negative under our assumptions. The condition above reduces to P(g2(0);2) 
C0(0) < 0, where g2(0) solves P 0(g2(0))g2(0) + P(g2(0);2) = 0. Since they are iden-
tical, this condition is valid for both rms simultaneously. Therefore we have to












1) may have an intersection for some pair of inventories. Before
detailing the equilibria, let us rst interpret the condition. P(g2(0);2)   C0(0) < 0
states that when the opponent is selling from his inventories, there is no point in
producing to put him with redundant inventories, since even if he behaves as a mo-
nopolist, the price falls below the marginal cost C0(0). It does not imply however
that rms are not able to sell anything: indeed P2(fi
2(0;0)) is still higher than C0(0).





1), with the same conditions than before. When P(g2(0);2)   C0(0)  0,
(s1
g;f;s2










1;2)   C0(0) > 0. To summarize, if the parameters are such
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1;2)   C0(0)  0
(s1
g;f;s2









1;2)   C0(0) > 0
The symmetric case P 0(x1
1)x1
1 + P(x1
1;2)   C0(0) > 0, P 0(x2
1)x2
1 + P(x2
1;2)  0 may
be established immediately.
29In the case P 0(x1
1)x1
1+P(x1
1;2) > 0, P 0(x1
1)x1
1+P(x1




1;2) > 0, P 0(x2
1)x2
1+P(x2
1;2) C0(0)  0, both reaction functions have two parts.
As soon as xi
1 < si
g;g for any agent, (s1
g;g;s2
g;g) cannot be an equilibrium anymore.
Therefore (s1
g;g;s2




g;g. Consider now that
x1
1 < s1







1)) is an equilibrium if the marginal revenue of selling the entire inventories





1;2)  0, equivalent to g2(x1
1) < x2
1.





1;2) > 0 and knowing that producing
anything to be sold in addition of the inventories leads to a negative marginal prot,


























































In the case where P 0(x1
1)x1
1 + P(x1
1;2) > 0, P 0(x1
1)x1
1 + P(x1




1;2)   C0(0) > 0, we have again to consider two cases separately.




1) will never cross. In addition
to the equilibria described before, (x1
1;s2
x;f) may also appear. Let us investigate the














1;2)  0 then rm
2 will not sell the whole inventories and the equilibrium is (x1
1;s2











1;2)   C0(0) < 0, rm








1;2)   C0(0)  0, rm 2 nds protable to produce again







g;g then the equilibrium is (s1
g;x;x2






1;2)  0, (x1
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1;2) C0(0)  0, and (x1
1;s2










g;g, the equilibrium is (x1
1;x2






1;2) C0(0)  0, and (x1
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1) have an intersection.






















g;g then the equilibrium is
(s1
g;x;x2





1;2)  0, (x1
1;x2













1;2)   c0(0) > 0, and (s1
g;f;s2
g;f) if.
Let us consider the last case, P 0(x1
1)x1
1 + P(x1




1;2)   C0(0) > 0, where again we have to distinguish P(g2(0);2)   C0(0) < 0
from P(g2(0);2)   C0(0)  0.





1) do not cross. Therefore there
will be 7 possible equilibria depending on the pair of inventories. In addition to the






x;f) are possible equilibria.



















1;2)   C0(0) > 0 then both rms will nd
protable to increase their sales. They will sell up to (s1
f;f;s2
f;f). Note that the




f;f, since the pair (s1
f;f;s2
f;f) is the


























1);2) > 0, then rm 1 will nd protable to sell exactly its invento-
ries. Depending on rm 2, the equilibrium will be either (x1
1;s2






1;2)   C0(0) > 0 or (x1
1;x2











1;2) > 0. This condition is equivalent to x2
1 < s2
x;f.





1) do cross. Therefore there





g;f). They arise when one rm does not nd protable
















1;2)  C0(0) > 0, rm 2 will place rm 1 with redundant inventories by increasing
its sales. The equilibrium in that case is (s1
g;f;s2






31C. FOR REFEREES ONLY - Proof of proposition 1
Since producing is costly, we may rule out from the set of best responses (and
consequently from the set of plausible equilibria) the pair of inventories such that at
least one rm sells less than its inventories (regions R1, R2, R3, R8 and R9): no rm
deviates unilaterally to these regions. Firms never choose simultaneously to store
and sell exactly their inventories (region R4). Indeed the second period prot in that
case is equal to the total revenue of selling (x1
1;x2







1). In rst period, the optimization of the total prot induces a choice xi
1








1) = 0 for any given
si











x;fg than everywhere else inside the region. Consequently
we may rule out regions R4 from the set of plausible equilibria.
D. FOR REFEREES ONLY - Proofs of lemmas 2 and 3
When rm 1 sells more than her inventories and rm 2 sells exactly her inventories
(regions R5 in lemma 1 and R7 in lemma ??), the marginal eect on second period







































The symmetric eects are valid when rm 2 sells more than its inventories and rm
1 sells exactly its inventories (regions R6 in lemma 1 and R8 in lemma ??.) The
eect of an increase of period 1 inventories of rm 1 on its own equilibrium second
period sales may be interpreted as follows. When keeping part of its production in
inventories, rm 1 splits the cost of producing s1
f;x between two periods. Since its
cost of production is convex, producing in two periods instead of one reduces the
marginal cost tomorrow and allows a Cournot competitor to be more aggressive on
the market15. This "cost smoothing" turns however to be strategic, contrary to what
it would be in perfect competition. The second equation shows that an increase in
15To say it dierently, it allows to replicate the production tool.
32the sales of the opponent decreases rm i sales: crucially, this eect does not rely
on the convexity of the cost function but on the "commitment eect" allowed by
inventories. If we allow for the second order derivative of the cost function to be
equal to 0, increasing its own inventories has no eect on rm 1 second period sales,
but an increase in rm 2's inventories reduces rm 1 sales.
When both rms sell strictly more than their inventories (regions R7 in lemma
1 and R9 in lemma ??), the eect of an increase in rm i and rm j inventories on






































































with P 0 = P 0(s1
f;f + s2






When their inventories allow them to produce again in second period, both rms
use it to benet from a "cost smoothing" eect. The eect of inventories on their
sales is again directly proportional to the convexity of the cost function, and disap-
pear when C00(q) is always nil. Increasing its inventories allows one rm to increase
its sales, and on the other hand an increase in its opponent's inventories reduces its
sales. The integration of those eects into the second period prot to measure the
marginal eect of inventories is straightforward.
E. FOR REFEREES ONLY - Proof of theorem 1
Under the assumption that the cost of production is linear, the two rst order
conditions dened in Ji can be treated separately for the two players. The rst


















1 ;1)   c = 0
33and this system leads obviously to a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium under
our assumptions on the inverse demand. In fact we do not need P 00(Q) constant to
characterize this equilibrium. If we are able to determine that it exists an equilibrium
(x1
1 ;x2
1 ) then rst period production will be equal to (q1
1 ;q2





a unique pair of second period sales resulting from this choice of inventories as stated














1) = 0 (E.1)
We have to insure rst that it denes a unique choice xi
1 for each x
j
1 and moreover
we need to verify that the best response function in each region is downward sloping
to be able to use the fact that downward jumps will lead to a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium16. Therefore we have to verify that the objective function is concave
with respect to xi
1 in each region, i.e. verify (19). Consider for example rm 1
(this reasoning can be applied symmetrically to rm 2). First, the expression of the




1 = c constant and




1 = 0 since this region
appears only because of the convexity of the cost of production. It remains to check
that we have the property on region R6. We have to compute the second order eect



































































x;f + 2P 0(x1
1 + s2
x;f)


































16See for example Tirole [1988] for a discussion of the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilib-





1 ) > 0, it follows immediately that when demand is linear (P 00 = 0),
the second order eect of inventories on prots is negative. We have obviously the
























































































































The sign of this last expression turns to be always negative. Indeed the rst part
between square brackets is a negative expression power 3, therefore negative, and the
expression between brackets is the sum of 3 positive expressions, therefore positive.
Consequently the program on region R6 is indeed concave. The implicit function
theorem applied to the rst order condition (E.2) gives the slope of the best response
function x1
1(x2


































which turns to be equal to zero. The maximum of rms prot is therefore unique
in the region where one rm act as a leader, and depends of the cost of storage,
the discount factor and the demand function. Therefore rms reaction functions are
non increasing. Let us show now that they are downward jumping.
Since it is costly to store (remember that H is the cost of storage) and to pro-
duce before selling due to the discount factor (the discounted cost of production is
35(1 + )C(x) in second period), and since a rm cannot modify the behaviour of an
opponent acting as a leader when its cost is linear, the best choice when facing a
leader is to store nothing. Therefore whenever a rm nds protable to produce and
store a leader quantity to be released in second period there will be an asymmetric
pure strategy Nash equilibrium (in fact two, since the roles of the two rms can be
permuted). If the leader does not nd protable to exert its leadership, then both
rms will not store at all. The pure strategy Nash equilibrium is symmetric and
rms do not store. The payos functions are therefore non concave in the graph
(x1
1;x2
1), with a peak at xi
1 = 0 in region R7 and a peak given by equation(E.2) for
x
j
1 = 0 in regions R5 or R6. The comparisons of the prots obtained when storing












1;0) = 0 (E.2)
determines the nature of the equilibrium and is the straightforward goal of proposi-
tions 1 and 2.
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